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Disclosure Standards and the Sensitivity of Returns to Mood 
 
 
  
Abstract: We provide evidence that higher-quality disclosure standards are associated with 
stock returns that are less sensitive to noise driven by investors’ moods. We identify return-mood 
sensitivity (RMS) based on the association between index returns and urban cloudiness, a source 
of short-term variation in mood. Based on a stylized model, we predict and find evidence 
consistent with higher-quality disclosure standards reducing RMS by tilting susceptible 
investors’ trades toward information and by facilitating sophisticated investors’ arbitrage. Our 
findings suggest that disclosure standards play an important role in enhancing price efficiency by 
reducing noise in returns, particularly noise related to investors’ short-term moods. (JEL G14, 
G15, M48) 
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Introduction 
This study investigates the relation between disclosure standards and the sensitivity of 
stock returns to investors’ short-term moods. We posit that noise from investors’ short-term 
moods enters returns through the trades of “susceptible” investors. These investors are generally 
rational and use any available public or private information. However, they are prone to 
misinterpreting signals; for example, they underweight informative signals or overweight 
noninformative signals like personal mood. If susceptible investors have access to informative 
corporate disclosures, underpinned by high-quality disclosure standards, we expect that they will 
be more likely to base investment decisions on such disclosures and less likely to rely on 
misattributed feelings, like mood (Schwarz and Clore 2007). We provide evidence on whether 
high-quality disclosure standards are negatively associated with return-mood sensitivity (RMS). 
We also examine how the effect of disclosure standards on RMS predictably varies based on 
proxies for relative levels of sophisticated and susceptible investors.  
We interpret RMS as reflecting noise in returns because short-term moods are unlikely to 
convey fundamental information. There is a significant identification problem in isolating the 
effect of disclosure standards on stock return noise. Several existing proxies for noise are 
plausibly contaminated by capturing information in addition to noninformative factors like 
sentiment (e.g., abnormal price volume and variance; closed-end fund discounts). Our 
identification strategy involves using urban cloudiness as a source of short-term, mood-based 
return noise. Prior studies have found a significant negative relation between urban cloud cover 
and index returns, argued by the studies to reflect the influence of short-term uninformative 
moods on returns due to an attribution bias (e.g., Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003). Although 
urban cloudiness is a salient noninformative signal that investors should disregard, cloudiness 
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has a negative influence on mood. Susceptible investors may view their mood as an informative 
signal relevant to trading decisions. With higher-quality disclosures, susceptible traders will have 
more precise information about firm fundamentals, lessening the influence of mood on 
subjective valuations and trading decisions (Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003; Clore, Schwarz, and 
Conway 1994; Forgas 1995). High-quality disclosures also provide information that facilitates 
arbitrage, further reducing noise driven by shocks to short-term mood.  
We investigate the relation between disclosure standards and return-mood sensitivity 
using a panel of 46 countries from 1995 through 2009. Using daily data, we estimate RMS for 
each country-year as the association between market returns and deseasonalized cloudiness in the 
city that hosts a country’s stock exchange. We standardize this association to correct for 
differences in estimation precision across country-years. We find that the average degree of RMS 
varies greatly across countries, suggesting that there are country-level factors, such as disclosure 
standards, that mitigate or exacerbate the effect of mood on market returns.  
We create country-year measures of disclosure standard quality using the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report and the disclosure index from the Center for 
International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). We isolate the impact of disclosure 
standards by controlling for economic development and the fraction of Internet users, both of 
which proxy for the level of susceptible-investor participation (and hence independently suggest 
higher levels of return-mood sensitivity). We also control for each country’s climate, legal 
tradition, and level of investor protection and estimate specifications using country and year 
fixed effects. We find consistent evidence that higher-quality disclosure standards are 
significantly associated with less return-mood sensitivity. These findings are consistent with 
higher-quality disclosures reducing the noise in returns induced by susceptible investor trading. 
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We provide additional insight into the relation between disclosure standards and RMS by 
examining cross-sectional variation in this relation. First, if disclosure standards affect the 
likelihood that susceptible investors trade based on information, rather than on cloudiness-
induced mood, then countries with a higher level of susceptible investor participation should 
experience larger reductions in return noise from higher-quality disclosure standards. We allow 
the coefficient on disclosure standard quality to vary based on three proxies for susceptible 
investor participation: GDP, Internet usage, and the fraction of the market that is closely held. 
We find that the coefficient on disclosure quality is only significant in high-participation 
countries. However, it is not consistently significantly larger than the coefficient in low-
participant countries, likely due to low power. Thus, there is weak evidence that disclosure 
standards have a greater effect on return noise when susceptible investor participation is greater. 
Second, higher-quality disclosure standards can facilitate sophisticated investors’ 
information gathering and processing, increasing the likelihood that they can arbitrage away 
mood-based noise in stock prices. For this mechanism to affect return-mood sensitivity, there 
must be a sufficient mix of both sophisticated and susceptible investors in the country, that is, 
enough susceptible investor participation to impound noise and enough sophisticated investor 
participation to effect arbitrage. To identify countries with a sufficient amount of both 
sophisticated and susceptible investors, we partition the sample sequentially based on the 
average fraction of the market that is closely held and then on the fraction held by mutual funds. 
Consistent with the arbitrage-facilitation mechanism, we find that high-quality disclosure 
standards have the biggest effect in reducing RMS in countries with relatively high mutual fund 
holdings and a low fraction of closely held shares. 
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A concern is that the results are driven by a correlated omitted variable related to foreign 
investor participation. Foreign investors are immune to the mood effects of local cloudiness and 
tend to invest in countries with better disclosure standards (Leuz, Lins, and Warnock 2009). 
These effects would cause a negative relation between disclosure standards and RMS 
independent of the susceptible investor effect. We address this concern by including two 
additional controls for foreign investor participation: an indicator for nonresident equity purchase 
restrictions (NREPR) and the fraction of the local market held by foreign mutual funds. Our 
findings are robust to the inclusion of these controls.    
To ensure that our results are not an artifact of the international setting, we also test our 
hypotheses in a sample of U.S. firms. We estimate RMS and disclosure quality at the firm-year 
level and find that high-quality disclosure is negatively associated with RMS in firms with high 
individual (i.e., susceptible) investor participation. The negative association is most pronounced 
when sophisticated investor participation is also high. We also find that firms with higher recent 
idiosyncratic volatility, that is, those firms likely to be more susceptible to sentiment (Baker and 
Wurgler 2006), tend to have higher RMS and larger negative associations between disclosure 
quality and RMS. Thus, the U.S. evidence is consistent with our international results. 
We contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the relation between 
information provided by public disclosures and return noise in capital markets. Previous studies 
find that high-quality disclosure standards are associated with higher liquidity, lower transaction 
costs, and lower costs of capital (e.g., Bloomfield and Wilks 2000; Daske et al. 2008; Francis, 
Khurana, and Pereira 2005; Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki 2010; Healy and Palepu 2001; Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000). While these are important facets of market efficiency, return noise remains 
relatively unexamined despite its theoretical prominence (e.g., Admati 1985; Black 1986; Kyle 
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1989; Verrecchia 1982) and its significant implications for price informativeness, capital 
allocation, systematic risk, and asset bubbles (De Long et al. 1989, 1990; Dichev, Huang, and 
Zhou 2010; Kyle 1985; Zhang 2010). Our study provides evidence on the role of disclosure 
standards in attenuating noise in returns that can impair market efficiency. 
We also contribute to the debate over the efficacy of regulation in improving price 
efficiency. We focus on return noise resulting from mood-susceptible traders, who are exactly 
the types of traders that securities regulators like the SEC implicitly target when enacting 
regulation. For example, disclosure standards are frequently motivated as a policy tool to protect 
relatively uninformed retail investors. Langevoort (2009, 1043) notes “The SEC’s habitual use of 
the disclosure remedy for purposes of retail investor  protection, for instance, rests on the 
unexamined (and often dubious) premise that investors who fall sufficiently short of the rational 
actor model to require paternalistic intervention will necessarily process the information 
rationally once it is delivered to them.”  
 To the extent that higher-quality disclosures help susceptible investors calibrate their 
sensitivities to various signals, and tilt away such traders from trades based on noninformative 
signals, our study suggests that disclosure regulation can effectively reduce noise in prices.  
1.  Hypothesis Development 
1.1 A theory of susceptible traders 
 We hypothesize that there is a potentially large class of investors who use information but 
who are susceptible to influence from noninformative signals. These traders are largely absent 
from the microstructure literature that features noise traders, although they are frequently implied 
by the exposition surrounding the model. For example, Lee (2001) presents a model in which he 
defines noise traders as investors trading on information that ex post is either value irrelevant or 
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wrong. Rather than suggesting that market participants are either purely noise traders or purely 
rational, we posit that market participants fall on a spectrum of susceptibility, with noise 
(sophisticated) traders falling on the more (less) susceptible end of the spectrum.1 For 
comparison to prior models that include only noise and purely rational traders, we treat 
susceptible traders as a separate group. 
To build hypotheses on how mood might affect stock prices, we adopt the “feelings-as-
information” perspective (Schwarz and Clore 2007). The primary idea is that feelings can inform 
decisions in the same way that traditional sources of information can. When evaluating a 
decision, such as whether to buy a stock, a susceptible investor might ask herself, “How do I feel 
about stocks?” Such a question may elicit integral feelings (i.e., feelings related to the decision 
target) like “they seem too risky for me” or “I feel good about the risk.” In this paper, we exploit 
the effects of incidental feelings (i.e., feelings unrelated to the decision target), such as mood 
caused by the weather. The feelings-as-information perspective implies that “mood-congruent 
judgments arise because people misread incidental moods as part of their apparent affective 
reaction to the target” (Schwarz and Clore 2007, 389). This perspective also supports the idea 
that the influence of mood on decisions is weaker when the decision maker has more decision-
relevant information or is more familiar with the decision context (e.g., Ottati and Isbell 1996). 
We incorporate these features into a simple asset-pricing model to show how disclosure 
standards and investor characteristics can influence the sensitivity of returns to mood (see the 
Appendix for full model). The model includes susceptible and rational traders in a competitive 
market with a single risky asset. A public disclosure provides information about the risky asset 
                                                     
1 Heuristic traders (e.g., in Fischer and Verrecchia 1999) can be considered a special case of susceptible traders, for 
which a noninformative factor like overconfidence affects the impact of information on trading strategies. 
7 
 
that both types of traders use. Susceptible investors receive an additional signal—their mood—
which they incorrectly interpret as informative about the risky asset’s value. The setup is similar 
in spirit to that of De Long et al. (1990)—whose setup features noise traders but no informational 
signal—and to Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001), whose setup features 
overconfident traders who overweight an informative signal. In contrast, the susceptible traders 
in our model put positive decision weight on a noninformative signal, while underweighting the 
informative disclosure. The model generates the following observations:  
1. Returns are positively associated with susceptible investors’ mood. 
2. For a risk-free asset, mood plays no role. 
3. Higher-quality disclosures reduce the mood-return association in (1). 
4. The impact of higher-quality disclosures on the mood-return association in (3) is stronger 
when there are more investors who are susceptible to mood. 
5. As long as there are a sufficient number of susceptible investors in the market, the effect 
described in (4) is stronger when there are more nonsusceptible investors. 
The extant literature has focused on market reactions to salient noninformative signals by 
examining the trading behavior of individual investors, who are assumed to be relatively 
unsophisticated and whose trades lose money on average (Barber and Odean 2000; Barber, 
Odean, and Zhu 2009; Hirshleifer et al. 2008). While the susceptible investor label plausibly 
applies well to individual investors, susceptible investors can encompass any class of investor 
that is influenced by mood. For example, Goetzmann et al. (2015) finds that weather-induced 
moods can influence institutional investors’ trading decisions, suggesting that institutional 
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investors display susceptibility as well.2 However, we expect sophisticated investors to be 
generally less susceptible to noninformative signals than are individual investors. 
Prior research on stock market reactions to salient noninformative signals includes that by 
Greene and Smart (1999), who provide evidence that the appearance of a stock in the 
“dartboard” section of the Wall Street Journal is associated with higher liquidity and lower 
adverse selection components of bid-ask spreads. Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007) find that 
international soccer results are significantly associated with subsequent abnormal stock returns. 
Although these studies focus on potential noise traders, they generally do not consider 
susceptibility or address the degree to which noise trades are priced or arbitraged away. Our 
measure of return-mood sensitivity allows us to directly examine the degree of return noise due 
to susceptible investors and how this noise is affected by disclosure standards.  
1.2 Investor mood as a noninformative signal 
Consistent with the “feelings-as-information” paradigm, current mood can influence 
evaluative judgments about specific targets (Schwarz and Clore 2003), including financial assets 
(Hirshleifer 2001). Recent work shows that measures of investor sentiment or mood are 
associated with stock market outcomes. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 1655) find an association 
between future returns and an index for the annual level of investor sentiment in the United 
States “based on the common variation in six underlying proxies for sentiment: the closed-end 
                                                     
2 Goetzmann et al. (2015) find evidence that cloudiness in the prior 14 days is associated with more institutional 
investor selling relative to buying and with survey-elicited perceptions of both overpricing and mispricing. 
However, they find that one-day cloudiness, which is the measure we use, is not associated with institutional 
investor mispricing. Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) find an absence of evidence for relations between individual 
investors’ trade imbalances and cloudiness in the city in which the investors reside, concluding that there is no 
evidence for cloudiness influencing retail investor trading activity. The retail-institutional investor dichotomy is not 
central to our theory; although we do use mutual fund holdings as a proxy for less mood-susceptible investors. Our 
empirical results on the effects of disclosure standards on RMS could be driven in part by mutual funds making 
better use of disclosures, rather than mutual funds being less susceptible to mood-influenced affect. In other words, 
their investment-mood sensitivity could decrease faster when the decision context becomes less uncertain. 
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fund discount, NYSE share turnover, the number and average first-day returns on IPOs, the 
equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium.” Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) find 
that sentiment is associated with returns of small, neglected firms using the University of 
Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment and the Conference Board’s Index of Consumer 
Confidence. Each of these measures of sentiment is plausibly confounded by capturing 
information in addition to noninformative sentiment (Sibley, Xing, and Zhang 2013). Moreover, 
these measures likely reflect longer-term trends in investor sentiment, which affect the economy 
and stock market by influencing fundamentals and informed trade (e.g., Mishkin 1978), whereas 
short-term mood is more likely to influence only noise in returns. 
In this study, we focus on a salient, noninformative signal—cloudiness—that is likely to 
be both short-term in nature and unaffected by disclosure standards. Weather affects individuals’ 
moods, and moods potentially influence cognition and behavior related to stock trading decisions 
through misattribution of weather-related feelings to feelings about the economy (Isen 2001) or 
changes in risk attitudes (Bassi, Colacito, and Fulghieri 2013). Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) 
show that cloudiness has a negative relationship with stock market returns, arguing that this 
relationship can be attributed to cognitive limitations and biases of traders, as it is not easily 
reconcilable with rational price discovery.3 Furthermore, short-term mood shocks based on 
weather are likely to be systematic and hence not diversifiable. Thus, we use the association 
between cloudiness and stock returns as a basis for measuring return-mood sensitivity. 
                                                     
3 Linnainmaa and Rosu (2009) provide an explanation for why rational agents’ trading behavior may be influenced by 
weather through variation in the opportunity cost of trading. Whether or not the association arises due to mood effects, 
it reflects a degree of nonfundamental information being impounded into prices and returns.  
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1.3 Disclosure quality and information 
While there is little direct evidence that high-quality disclosure tilts trades toward 
information and away from sentiment, prior work finds that disclosure quality is positively 
associated with measures related to liquidity, transaction costs, and the cost of capital (e.g., 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker 2003; Bloomfield and Wilks 2000; Diamond and Verrecchia 
1991; Healy and Palepu 2001; Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007). 
At the country level, prior research suggests that high-quality disclosure standards reduce 
information asymmetry across investors and improve comparability across firms (see Hail, Leuz, 
and Wysocki 2010 for a review of this literature).4 Furthermore, mandatory disclosures like 
earnings announcements provide not only firm-specific information but also macroeconomic 
information through information transfers and spillovers (Foster 1981; Savor and Wilson 2013).  
The psychological literature suggests that the influence of mood is stronger in less-certain 
decision contexts (e.g., Forgas 1995). Hirshleifer (2001) notes that “people are likely to be more 
prone to bias in valuing securities for which information is sparse,” (1537) and that “Mood states 
tend to affect relatively abstract judgments more than specific ones about which people have 
concrete information.” (1551). By providing susceptible and sophisticated investors with a 
greater amount of information, high-quality disclosure standards should reduce the sensitivity of 
returns to mood, consistent with observation 3 from the model, leading to Hypothesis 1. 
H1: Disclosure standard quality is negatively associated with return-mood sensitivity. 
                                                     
4 Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006) also examine links between information availability and 
properties of stock returns. However, they focus on synchronicity and crash risk, while we focus on the sensitivity of 
returns to short-term mood. Our finding that disclosure is associated with RMS is consistent with the interpretation 
in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) that informed arbitrageurs reduce noise by more when they take larger positions, 
either due to greater ability to retain their profits (property rights protections) or due to greater availability of 
information (disclosure standards). Our finding does not speak as directly to Jin and Myers (2006), who argue that 
transparency increases firm-specific return variation by impairing insiders’ ability to divert cash flows. The theory 
underlying our analysis implies that better disclosures would allow more firm-specific information to be capitalized 
into price by rational outsiders, while reducing noise capitalized by outsiders susceptible to mood-based trading. 
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We provide additional insight into the relation between disclosure standards and return-
mood sensitivity by examining whether cross-sectional variation in this relation is driven by 
better-informed susceptible investors, better-informed sophisticated investors, or both. Prior 
work suggests that individual investors use firms’ disclosures to guide their trades. Bushee, 
Matsumoto, and Miller (2004) find a significant increase in small trades during conference calls 
when individual investors are provided access to calls after Regulation FD. Brüggemann et al. 
(2009) show that firm-level IFRS adoption is associated with individual investment on the 
German Open Market. Lawrence (2013) finds that individual investors tend to invest in firms 
with more readable, transparent, and concise financial statements. Taylor (2010) finds increases 
in individual investor trading around earnings announcements, though the trades on average 
result in losses.5 Together, these studies suggest that individual investors, on average, use firms’ 
disclosures but are relatively unsophisticated (i.e., they are susceptible investors). If disclosure 
standards reduce return-mood sensitivity by improving susceptible investors’ information set, 
then settings with a higher level of susceptible investor participation should experience larger 
reductions in return-mood sensitivity due to higher-quality disclosure standards. This argument, 
consistent with observation 4, leads to Hypotheses 2. 
H2: The effect of disclosure standard quality on return-mood sensitivity is stronger when 
there is more susceptible investor participation. 
Disclosure standards can also facilitate sophisticated investors’ information gathering and 
processing, increasing the likelihood that they can arbitrage away any return-mood sensitivity 
due to susceptible investor trading. Prior studies find that sophisticated investors use information 
                                                     
5 These investor losses are higher around more informative earnings announcements, suggesting that the investors in 
Taylor’s (2010) sample pay attention to, but misinterpret, the information in earnings announcements. 
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from public disclosures to mitigate mispricing (e.g., Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky 2000; 
Collins, Gong, and Hribar 2003) or to improve forecasts (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001). However, 
for this arbitrage mechanism to affect return-mood sensitivity, there must be a sufficient mix of 
both sophisticated and susceptible investors in the country. Given a sufficiently large pool of 
unsophisticated investors, disclosure standards should have a stronger effect when there are 
relatively more sophisticated investors who can use the information for arbitrage. These 
arguments, consistent with observation 5, lead to Hypotheses 3. 
H3: Given a sufficient level of susceptible investor participation, the effect of disclosure 
standard quality on sentiment-based return noise is stronger when there are more 
sophisticated investors.  
2. Empirical Methodology 
2.1 Return-mood sensitivity 
We construct our measure of return-mood sensitivity based on the sensitivity of local 
market stock returns to deseasonalized cloudiness. For 26 cities and the period 1982 through 
1997, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) examine the relation between daily stock market index 
returns and cloud cover in the city in which the stock market is located . In our first stage, we 
extend their sample to 46 countries between 1995 and 2009. As in Hirshleifer and Shumway 
(2003), we estimate regressions of daily local index returns (RET) on “sky coverage” (SKC), 
which is a measure of deseasonalized cloudiness. We also control for the world portfolio index 
return (WR), which reflects macroeconomic information. The model is 
, , , , , ,* *i d i SKC i i d WR i i d i dRET SKC WRα β β ε= + + + ,     (1) 
where i denotes country-year and d denotes day. ,SKC iβ  in Equation (1) is an estimate of the 
sensitivity of price to SKC, a noninformative signal. 
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We estimate this regression separately for each country-year. We define return-mood 
sensitivity (RMS) as the negative t-statistic of the coefficient on SKCi,d, which is the coefficient 
divided by its standard error. The t-statistic is a measure of the strength of the relationship 
deflated by the noise in the estimation of the relationship, both of which vary across country-
years. Regression (1) also can be interpreted as the first stage of a two-stage least-squares 
regression, where SKCi,d is used as an instrument for RETi,d. In this interpretation, SKCi,d is a 
stronger instrument when RMS is higher.  
We collect index returns data from Datastream and cloud coverage data from the 
International Surface Weather Observations dataset.6 Sky coverage is calculated using the 
average cloud cover between 6 a.m. and 4 p.m. for cities in which the country’s primary stock 
exchange resides. Cloud cover is measured on a scale of zero to eight, representing the number 
of eighths of the sky that are covered by clouds.7 Since cloudiness is seasonal, the average daily 
cloud cover measure is deseasonalized by subtracting the week’s average cloudiness over the 
entire time series from the daily cloudiness measure, consistent with Hirshleifer and Shumway’s 
(2003) methodology. This adjusted sky coverage measure (SKCi,d) controls for geographic and 
seasonal factors that may influence returns independent of cloudiness (e.g., Keim 1983). 
2.2 Disclosure standards 
We measure disclosure standard quality using the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) and the CIFAR index. The GCR is published annually and, since 
1999, includes data on either the quality of disclosure or the accounting standards based on the 
                                                     
6 These data are provided by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
7 For some observations, the range is different but is scaled to the [0,8] interval. The city must have at least three 
observations during this ten-hour period for the city-day cloudiness observation to be nonblank. 
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World Economic Forum’s extensive Executive Opinion Survey.8 In 1999 and 2000, the GCR 
reported average country-level responses to “The level of financial disclosure required is 
extensive and detailed. (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree).” These measures are used in 
Gelos and Wei (2005) and Jin and Myers (2006) to measure country-level opacity related to 
disclosure standards. From 2002 through 2009, the GCR reported average country-level 
responses to “In your country, how would you assess financial auditing and reporting standards 
regarding company financial performance? (1 = extremely weak; 7 = extremely strong).”9 For 
disclosure quality prior to 1998, we use values for the 1995 CIFAR, as reported in Bushman, 
Piotroski, and Smith (2004). It is constructed as the sum of indicators for specific disclosure 
items in companies’ annual reports, averaged at the country level, based on annual report 
disclosures from the early 1990s. Values of all GCR and CIFAR variables are standardized so 
that each year is mean zero and unit variance. This allows for better comparison across years, 
especially when comparing the CIFAR score to the GCR-based scores.10  
We use these standardized proxies to construct a country-year-level disclosure score 
(DISC). We use the individual GCR score as DISC for 1999, 2000, and 2002–2009. There is no 
GCR score for 2001; we define DISC as mean of the 2000 and 2002 GCR scores. We use the 
1999 GCR score for the 1998 value of DISC. For 1995–1997, we use the CIFAR score. The 
country-level standardized proxies are all positively and significantly correlated (p < 0.001), with 
                                                     
8 For example, the 2009 Executive Opinion Survey had 12,614 respondents in 133 countries. 
9 The wording of the strength of accounting and auditing question in the GCR changes slightly from year to year but 
always asks the respondent to rate the country’s auditing and reporting standards on a 1 to 7 scale. 
10 An additional benefit of the survey-based GCR measures is that they also capture the enforcement of disclosure 
standards because survey respondents are likely to consider enforcement when evaluating the quality of the standards. 
Hope (2003) constructs a country-level measure of accounting enforcement based on audit spending, insider trading, 
judicial efficiency, rule of law, and antidirector rights. In an unreported country-level regression using values reported 
by Hope (2003) for 22 countries, we find that the judicial efficiency, rule of law, and antidirector rights scales help 
explain over 90% of the variation in Hope’s enforcement measure (R2 = 0.909). Since these variables are included 
separately as controls or captured by country-level fixed-effects, we do not utilize Hope’s enforcement measure.  
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correlations ranging from 0.57 (between the 1995 CIFAR score and the 2009 GCR score) to 0.98 
(between the 2007 and 2008 GCR scores). In subsequent regressions, standard errors are 
clustered at the country level, and country-level fixed effects are employed to mitigate concerns 
related to the persistence of within-country measures like DISC.  
2.3 Control variables 
We include a number of control variables to account for the fact that disclosure standards 
do not exist independently of a country’s broader market environment. We limit the main set of 
control variables to those that are plausibly exogenous with respect to disclosure standards; for 
example, we omit controls such as average returns, cost of capital, and liquidity.  
High-quality disclosure standards could be associated with high return-mood sensitivity 
because susceptible traders provide an incentive for regulators to impose tougher standards. 
Recent research on the relation between financial institutions and market development suggests 
that stock market development can encourage participation, which creates political support for 
shareholder protections like disclosure standards (e.g., Bebchuk and Neeman 2010; Pagano and 
Volpin 2006). We use three main controls for susceptible investor participation: country fixed 
effects, wealth, and Internet use. Country fixed effects will absorb variation in RMS caused by 
average participation at the country-level over the sample period. Wealth is a necessary condition 
for market participation; thus, wealthier societies are prone to have a greater number of small, 
relatively uninformed noise traders (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008a).11 We control for 
country wealth using the natural logarithm of per capita gross domestic product (GDP), 
measured at purchasing power parity based on data reported by Euromonitor International. 
                                                     
11 However, wealth might also increase the benefits to information acquisition. Fund managers are often rewarded 
based on a percentage of assets or returns. Thus, managers of larger funds, made possible by wealthier societies, have 
a greater incentive to engage in informed arbitrage. 
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Finally, countries with a high fraction of Internet users will likely have relatively more trades by 
susceptible investors, since Internet access provides a low-cost trading method. We control for 
the fraction of the population that uses the Internet (INTERNET), calculated as the number of 
Internet users divided by the population, both reported by Euromonitor International. 
We also include controls related to the institutional environment. These measures are 
generally expected to favor uninformed investors and thus be positively related to return noise, 
although they could also favor information-based arbitrageurs. These factors also may be related 
to disclosure standards and market efficiency within a comprehensive legal framework (e.g., Li 
2010; Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 2007). We include an indicator variable, 
COMMON, that is equal to one if the country’s legal origin is common law and zero otherwise 
(as classified in La Porta et al. 1998). We also include a country-year index of country risk 
constructed from three indices from the International Country Risk Guide, each scaled to the 
[0,1] interval with high values indicating low country risk. Our composite index, ICRG, is the 
average of (1) Investment Profile, which represents risk related to contract viability, 
expropriation, profit repatriation, and payment delays, (2) Rule of Law, which represents the 
impartiality and strength of the legal system and the legal observance by the general population 
of the country, and (3) Corruption, which measures corruption in the political system that is 
relevant to the business environment, like the prevalence of bribery or extortion related to 
business transactions. 
We include an indicator variable for tropical climates because the affective impact of 
cloudiness can vary by climate. Morrissey et al. (1996) reports that excessive heat and humidity 
are the two most influential environmental factors affecting negative mood in the tropics, 
suggesting that abnormal cloudiness has a positive effect on mood in tropical countries by 
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reducing excess heat. In addition, Easterly and Levine (2003) find that tropical countries have 
lower rates of development than do temperate countries due to differences in institutional 
structures, which could be correlated with disclosure practices. We include an indicator variable, 
TROPICAL, that is equal to one for countries with latitudes between the Tropic of Cancer and 
Tropic of Capricorn (i.e., absolute latitude less than 23.4 degrees), and zero otherwise.12  
Finally, in our additional analyses, we include a number of variables to measure investor 
composition and participation in each country. We proxy for investor participation using the 
fraction of the market that is closely held (CH), as reported by Dahlquist et al. (2003). We proxy 
for the concentration of sophisticated investors using the average fraction of the market 
capitalization held by mutual funds (MF) based on data from Thomson Financial S12, SP7, and 
Datastream. We compute the same measure for foreign mutual funds (Foreign MF) to proxy for 
the presence of foreign investors that may be less susceptible to the weather in the local 
market.13 As an additional proxy for foreign investor participation, we include an indicator 
variable, NREPR, equal to one for countries with nonresident equity purchase restrictions and 
zero otherwise, taken from Schindler (2009) and the International Monetary Fund’s Annual 
Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
 
                                                     
12 The latitudes are reported in La Porta et al. (1999), who uses the latitude measure from the CIA World Factbook, 
representing “rounded latitude and longitude figures for the centroid or center point of a country.” 
13 Foreign investors still may be susceptible to weather-induced mood if they rely on the analysis and decisions of 
local analysts. Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) find that 44.8% of analysts provide at least one forecast of a firm as a 
local expatriate analyst (i.e., an analyst local to the firm but employed by a foreign research firm). 
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3. Sample Description and Results 
3.1 Sample and descriptive statistics 
We chose our initial list of countries based on those used by La Porta et al. (1998). 
Starting from their list of 49 countries, we collected market index data from Datastream. We 
chose to start the sample in 1995 because INTERNET tends to be zero for years before 1995 due 
to technological constraints. We eliminated Sri Lanka, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe due to a lack of 
available data. The final sample consists of 46 countries and between 350 and 644 country-year 
observations, depending on the variables included in the tests. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables for each of the countries. The 
first two columns show the range of years with data availability and the number of years with 
nonmissing RMS and DISC data. Missing country-years are generally due to a lack of weather 
data necessary to calculate the measure of return-mood sensitivity. The table shows that 34 (12) 
countries exhibit a positive (negative) average value for RMS, representing a negative (positive) 
relation between local market returns and sky coverage (SKC). Thus, while the overall sample 
mean value of RMS is positive, suggesting weather-induced moods negatively impact market 
returns, there is a great deal of cross-sectional variation. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main regression variables. The mean and 
median values of RMS are positive and significantly different from zero (p < 0.01), consistent 
with the overall negative association between sky coverage and returns in Hirshleifer and 
Shumway (2003). However, the magnitude of mean RMS is small, largely due to the small 
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sample sizes in the country-year regressions (n ≈ 250).14 RMS has a standard deviation of 0.993, 
with a range of -3.308 to +3.905, suggesting considerable variation in RMS across country-years.  
The mean and median of DISC are close to zero by construction, but different from zero 
because of slight differences in the sample for the earlier years. Taking exponents of the reported 
GDP value, the geometric average real per capita wealth is $14,443, and real GDP ranges from 
$1,150 to $53,316. The mean fraction of Internet users (INTERNET) is 29.5%, but ranges from 
zero to 92.3%. About 34% of the country-years are for common-law countries (COMMON) and 
about 33% are for tropical (TROPICAL) countries. The average percentage of the market is that 
is closely held is 45.3%, with 12% (9%) of the market held by mutual funds (foreign mutual 
funds) on average. About 12% of the country-years had nonresident equity purchase restrictions 
(NREPR).  
3.2 Correlations  
Table 3 reports univariate correlations among the main variables. RMS is positively and 
significantly correlated with GDP, INTERNET, and ICRG, suggesting that wealth, technology, 
and investor protections are associated with unsophisticated investor participation and greater 
return-mood sensitivity. Although wealthier, more-developed economies tend to have many 
favorable market characteristics that could facilitate arbitrage by informed traders, such as high 
market capitalization, low costs of capital, and low illiquidity (e.g., Hail and Leuz 2006; La Porta 
et al. 1998), the correlation evidence suggests that at least a portion of the additional mood-based 
return noise is not corrected by informed trades.  
                                                     
14 For example, the mean RMS for Austria based on 15 country-year regressions is 0.324.  If we estimate RMS for 
Austria using a regression with all 15 years pooled (n = 3,817), RMS is 1.672.  Thus, as a t-statistic, the value of 
RMS is highly sensitive to sample size. But the sample sizes are almost identical across country-year regressions, 
and the variation in RMS is sufficient to provide enough power to find a relation between disclosure standards and 
RMS. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, DISC and RMS are not significantly correlated. However, note that 
DISC and GDP are highly positively correlated (r = 0.609). In general, more advanced 
economies, represented by higher GDP, have both more RMS and higher-quality disclosure 
standards. This positive relation between DISC and GDP provides a suppressor effect that masks 
the hypothesized negative relation between DISC and RMS. The regression results in the next 
section corroborate this suppressor effect. In fact, GDP is significantly correlated with all other 
variables, indicating that controlling for GDP in the later regressions is necessary to detect 
underlying relations between the other variables and RMS, independent of wealth.  
3.3 Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Table 4 reports the results of the regressions related to Hypothesis 1. Each regression is a 
least-squares estimate of the following equation:  
* 'i i i iRMS DISC Xα β ε= + +Γ + ,     (2) 
where X is a vector of controls and i denotes country-year. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level to adjust for within-country correlation across years. 
Model (1) of Table 4 includes only year fixed effects and TROPICAL as controls. The 
coefficient on DISC is negative but insignificantly different from zero, consistent with the 
insignificant univariate correlation between RMS and DISC shown in Table 3. Model (2) 
includes GDP as an additional control and the coefficient on DISC is negative and significant,
( 0.112,β = −  p < 0.05), supporting Hypothesis 1, in that disclosure standard quality is negatively 
associated with RMS. The coefficient on GDP in model (2) is positive and significant
( 0.141,GDPΓ = , p < 0.001), consistent with wealth increasing susceptible investor participation 
and hence RMS. Model (3) includes INTERNET as an alternative proxy for investor participation 
and provides results similar to model (2). A comparison of models (2) and (3) to model (1) 
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suggests that disclosure standards are positively related to susceptible investor participation, 
which in turn is positively related to RMS, biasing the coefficient on DISC upward in model (1). 
Controlling for participation mitigates this correlated omitted variable issue, allowing the 
negative relation between disclosure standards and RMS to become apparent. 
Models (4), (5), and (6) include varying controls, but generally confirm the inferences 
from models (2) and (3). Model (4) includes both GDP and INTERNET as controls. The 
coefficient on DISC remains negative and significant ( 0.126,β = −  p < 0.001), but the 
coefficients on GDP and INTERNET, while still positive, are no longer statistically significant. 
This insignificance likely results from multicollinearity, as the correlation between GDP and 
INTERNET is 0.7. Model (5) drops INTERNET but adds COMMON and ICRG, which capture 
the legal and institutional environment. The inferences from model (5) are similar to those from 
model (2), although the coefficient on COMMON is positive and significant ( 0.163,CommonLawΓ =
p < 0.10), suggesting that countries with common law backgrounds tend to have higher levels of 
RMS, on average, than countries with code law backgrounds, which is likely related to a 
susceptible investor participation effect.  
Model (6) includes country-level fixed effects and drops the country-level indicators 
COMMON and TROPICAL. Explanatory power increases dramatically, as the R2 in model (6) is 
0.124, while the highest R2 from the other models is 0.071. This suggests that much of the 
variation in RMS can be explained by country-level features. The coefficient on DISC in model 
(6) remains negative and significant ( 0.213,β = −  p = 0.029), consistent with models (2) through 
(5). Model (6) provides strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 as it is the least susceptible to 
a correlated omitted variable problem.  
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To shed some light on economic effects, we interpret the coefficient magnitudes from the 
perspective of a researcher trying to infer whether mood is associated with returns, using 
Bayesian updating and starting with diffuse priors. From Table 2, the mean of RMS is 0.132, 
which suggests that the average probability of inferring sentiment-based noise is approximately 
55.2%, based on the t-distribution for 644 observations. The coefficient estimate from Model (6) 
of Table 4 suggests that increasing DISC from one-standard-deviation below the mean to one-
standard-deviation above is associated with a 35% reduction in the probability of inferring 
RMS.15 Thus, the coefficient magnitudes suggest that the results reflect a meaningful economic 
effect. 
3.4 Tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 
Next, we provide evidence related to Hypothesis 2 (disclosure standards reduce RMS 
more when investor participation is broader) and Hypothesis 3 (conditional on broad 
participation, disclosure standards reduce RMS more when there are more sophisticated 
investors) using the following regression model:  
* * 'i Split i i iRMS DISC Split Xα β ε= + +Γ +∑ ,    (3)  
which is similar to Equation (2), except that the coefficient on DISC varies across different 
partitions of the data, based on Split. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we allow the coefficient on disclosure (DISC) to vary based on 
susceptible investor participation. We split countries into high and low participation groups 
based on GDP. Countries with above-median (below-median) GDP in 2002, the middle of our 
                                                     
15 The mean and standard deviation of DISC are 0 and 1, respectively. The coefficient on DISC in Model (6) of 
Table 4 is 0.212. From the mean value of RMS, a DISC value of -1 (1) is associated with an expected RMS of -0.080 
(0.344), which corresponds to a 46.8% (63.4%) probability of inferring mood-based returns based on a t-distribution 
for 644 observations. The 35% reduction is calculated as 0.35 (46.8 63.4) / 46.8− = − . 
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sample, are considered high (low) investor participation countries. We also partition countries 
using a similar median split based on INTERNET. As an additional proxy for investor 
participation, we use the fraction of the market that is closely held (CH). Countries with a high 
(low) fraction of stocks closely held should have relatively low (high) investor participation. 
Models (1) and (2) of Table 5 present evidence supporting Hypothesis 2. In model (1), 
the coefficient on DISC is negative and significant for countries with high participation, proxied 
for by high GDP ( 0.325,HighGDPβ = −  p < 0.01). The coefficient on DISC is negative, but not 
significantly different from zero, for low participation countries ( 0.095,LowGDPβ = −  p > 0.10). 
This result suggests that the effects of disclosure are strongest where there is broad investor 
participation; however, it is important to note that the two DISC coefficients in model (1) are not 
significantly different from each other (p = 0.17). Results are similar when INTERNET is used as 
the partition variable. The coefficient on DISC for the high participation countries is significantly 
negative ( 0.331,HighInternetβ = −  p < 0.01), while the coefficient on DISC for the low participation 
countries is negative but insignificant ( 0.088,LowInternetβ = −  p > 0.10). As with GDP as the 
partition variable, the DISC*Low INTERNET and DISC*High INTERNET coefficients are only 
marginally significantly different from each other (p = 0.14). In model (3), the coefficient on 
DISC varies depending on the value of CH, which we expect to be inversely related to investor 
participation. Consistent with the results for GDP and INTERNET, the coefficient on DISC for 
the high participation countries is significantly negative, ( 0.345,LowCHβ = −  p < 0.01), while the 
coefficient on DISC for the low participation countries is negative but insignificant
( 0.077,HighCHβ = − p > 0.10). These coefficients are nearly significantly different from each other 
(p = 0.12). Overall models (1), (2), and (3) of Table 5 present evidence that the disclosure effect 
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is concentrated in high participation countries, but we do not have sufficient power to find a 
significant difference between high and low participation countries using a two-tailed test. 
To test Hypothesis 3, we split the sample hierarchically in model (5) of Table 5. We first 
use the same median split as in model (3), based on the fraction of the market that is closely held. 
Next, within each CH group, we split the countries into those with above- and below-median 
mutual fund holdings (MF). This approach yields four groups. Within each CH group, countries 
with higher MF values tend to have lower CH values. Across CH groups, countries with higher 
CH tend to have lower MF.  
 MF is a proxy for the concentration of sophisticated investors who should be able to use 
disclosures to facilitate arbitrage and reduce RMS. We also split on CH because Hypothesis 3 
suggests disclosures will help sophisticated investors reduce RMS specifically when a sufficient 
amount of susceptible traders are already in the market. If most of the market is held by insiders, 
we would not expect disclosures to help sophisticated investors arbitrage away mood-based 
noise. Also, insiders would tend not to find disclosures informative because they plausibly 
already possess the information.  
Column (5) of Table 5 presents an estimated regression in which the coefficient on DISC 
varies for each of the four country groups. The coefficient on DISC is negative and significant 
only when CH is low but MF is high ,( 0.531,LowCH HiMFβ = − p < 0.01). The coefficient on DISC 
when CH and MF are both low is negative but insignificant ,( 0.203,LowCH LowMFβ = − p > 0.10). 
For the remaining country groups with high CH, the coefficients are insignificantly different 
from zero.16 Column (4) of Table 5 presents a model in which the coefficient on DISC is 
                                                     
16 An F-test rejects the null that the DISC coefficients are equal across all groups (F = 2.30, p = 0.09).  
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partitioned based on only the average fraction of mutual fund holdings in each country. The 
coefficients on DISC are negative but significantly different from zero only for countries high 
average mutual fund holdings ( 0.216,HighMFβ = − p < 0.10), consistent with the logic in 
Hypothesis 3 that disclosure standards reduce RMS by facilitating arbitrage primarily when there 
is a sufficient amount of noise in the market, which is generated by relatively unsophisticated 
investor participation. Overall, these coefficients suggest that disclosure standards facilitate the 
largest reduction in RMS when there are low insider holdings and high mutual fund holdings, 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. Together with the evidence for Hypothesis 2, the results imply that 
disclosure standards help reduce RMS, both by facilitating arbitrage and by tilting 
unsophisticated investors’ trades away from RMS.  
3.5 Additional analyses 
3.5.1  Controlling for foreign investor participation. A possible alternative explanation for 
the significant association between DISC and RMS is that high-quality disclosure standards 
attract foreign investors, who are less susceptible to weather-induced mood in the local market. 
Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009) and Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) find that foreign 
investors prefer to invest in firms with better disclosure quality. Thus, if better disclosure 
standards significantly increase the participation of investors located outside of the area, this 
would provide a mechanism to reduce the amount of RMS. Finding a relation between DISC and 
RMS after explicitly controlling for foreign investor participation would help dismiss this 
alternative explanation. 
In Table 6, panel A, we control for the participation of foreign investors with two proxies.  
In columns (1) and (2), we include an indicator variable (NREPR) for any nonresident equity 
purchase restrictions in the county-year. The coefficient on NREPR is positive and significant, 
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indicating that RMS is higher when foreign investors are limited from participating in the market, 
consistent with foreign investors reducing RMS by not being susceptible to local weather. The 
coefficient on DISC remains negative and significant at the 0.05 level, both in the main 
specification and in the specification in which DISC is interacted with Low CH to capture high 
investor-participation country-years. In Columns (3) and (4), we include the percent of the 
market held by foreign mutual funds (Foreign MF). These data are only available after 2001, 
reducing the sample size to 350. The coefficient on Foreign MF is not significant. The 
coefficient on DISC remains negative and significant at the 0.10 level in both specifications.17 
This evidence is consistent with disclosure standards having an impact on RMS through effects 
on local investors, and not solely through the attraction of greater foreign investors. 
3.5.2 Country-level regressions. Because standard error clustering may not effectively control 
for repeated country-level observations, we also estimate regressions at the country-level using 
the mean values of the variables for each country (as reported in Table 1). Table 6, panel B, 
presents the results of these regressions. In Columns (1) and (2), we include the variables used in 
Table 4—DISC, GDP, COMMON, and TROPICAL—but drop INTERNET and ICRG due to high 
multicollinearity.18 In Column (1), we use all 46 countries in Table 1 for which we have 
nonmissing DISC and RMS measures and the coefficient on DISC is negative and significant at 
the 0.10 level. In Column (2), we estimate the same regression using only the 40 countries that 
also have nonmissing data for closely held and mutual fund ownership. The coefficient on DISC 
is negative and significant at the 0.05 level. The higher significance level on DISC is consistent 
                                                     
17 We estimated the regressions in Columns (3) and (4) using the same sample size, but dropping the Foreign MF 
variable, and the coefficient on DISC was still significant at the 0.10 level.  This suggests that the lower power from 
the smaller sample, not the control for foreign investor participation, influences the significance of DISC. 
18 The Variance Inflation Factors for INTERNET and for ICRG both exceed ten, which is the benchmark for harmful 
mulicollinearity given in Kennedy (1998). The VIFs for the other variables do not exceed three. 
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with the result in Table 5 that disclosure quality has a large impact on RMS in countries with 
high GDP; the six countries dropped in Column (2) due to missing holdings data are all in the 
lowest quartile of GDP.  
In the remaining columns of panel B, we include the variables used in our additional 
analyses: closely held (CH), mutual fund ownership (MF), nonresident equity purchase 
restrictions (NREPR), and foreign mutual fund ownership (Foreign MF). In each case, the 
coefficient on DISC remains negative and significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, our finding that 
disclosure quality affects RMS holds when we use country-level means.  
The coefficients on GDP are consistently positive and significant at the 0.05 level in 
Table 6, panel B, consistent with the coefficient estimates from regressions in Table 4 when 
estimated without country fixed effects. Thus, RMS is positively associated with macroeconomic 
development in the cross-section, implying that, as an economy develops, its markets become 
more sensitive to behavioral biases. This result is consistent with evidence on the association 
between macroeconomic development and stock market participation (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales 2008b). In more-developed economies, more-susceptible investors own and trade shares 
and thereby generate greater return-mood sensitivity. Overall, however, results from regressions 
with country fixed effects (e.g., Table 4, model (6)) suggest that the associations between GDP 
and RMS might be attributable to other sources of cross-sectional variation.19  
                                                     
19 The consistently negative relation between TROPICS and RMS raises the possibility that the sign of the 
association between DISC and RMS differs between tropical and nontropical countries. Table IA.4 (IA.5) in the 
Internet Appendix presents replications of the regressions reported in Table 4 (Table 6, panel B), but with all 
coefficients estimated separately for tropical and nontropical countries. The negative significant associations 
between DISC and RMS are present only for the nontropical countries, consistent with (1) cloudier days having a 
weaker or ambiguous effect on mood in tropical countries, (2) tropical countries being less developed and having 
lower stock market participation (see also results in Section 4.4), and (3) greater noise in the estimation of RMS for 
tropical countries (i.e., standard error on βSKC estimated from Equation (1) is three times higher, on average, for 
tropical-country regressions compared to non-tropical-country regressions). 
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3.5.3 Robustness. The negative association between DISC and RMS is robust to several 
alternative specifications (all tabled in an Internet Appendix). First, negative values of RMS, 
which would indicate positive effects of cloudiness on price, could reflect noisy measures of 
situations in which cloudiness has no effect on prices (i.e., RMS equals zero). We defined the 
variable RMSpos to equal RMS when RMS is positive and zero otherwise. Table IA.1, model (1) 
shows that our inference from our main regression (model (6) in Table 4) is the same when we 
use RMSpos as the dependent variable. Second, the DISC proxy is based on measures from both 
CIFAR and the GCR, and differences between these two sources may influence our results. 
Table IA.1, model (2), shows that the inference from the main regression is the same if it is 
estimated only during years in which the GCR measures are available (1998–2009). Third, since 
the effects of GDP on DISC and RMS may be nonlinear, we include indicators for GDP quintile 
in our main regression. The coefficient on DISC remains negative and significant at the 0.05 
level (Table IA.1, model (3)).  Fourth, last year’s returns may encourage susceptible investor 
participation, enhance investor confidence, and/or influence the responses to the World 
Economic Forums’ opinion surveys. We add a control for stock market returns in the previous 
year to our main regression and the coefficient on DISC remains negative and significant at the 
0.05 level (Table IA.1, model (4)). 
Fifth, a levels regression may inadequately control for unobservable variables, so we 
estimate a regression of the change in RMS on the changes in DISC and INTERNET, with fixed 
effects for country and year and country-level clustering. Table IA.2 shows that the coefficient 
on the change in DISC is negative and significant (p < 0.10). When the change in GDP is 
included as an additional control, the coefficient on the change in DISC remains negative, but the 
p-value rises to 0.13, suggesting a weak result in changes, likely due to the low level of 
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dispersion in the annual changes variables. Sixth, RMS is based on t-statistics from estimations of 
Equation (1), so variation in market-level return volatility could cause variation in RMS. If DISC 
is also associated with return volatility (e.g., if investors in more volatile markets demand higher 
DISC), then our results could be driven by underlying variation in return volatility. We estimate 
the regressions in Table 4 with an additional control for return volatility. The results in Table 
IA.3 confirm that our main results are not driven by underlying variation in return volatility. 
Overall, these additional tests provide support for our main finding that disclosure standards are 
negatively related to return-mood sensitivity. 
3.5.4 Evidence from a U.S. sample. We also test our hypotheses using firm-level data in the United 
States to ensure that our results are not an artifact of the international setting. Within the United 
States, we estimate the following regression for each firm-calendar year j using daily 
observations: 
, , , ,*j d j SKC j j d j dRET SKCα β ε= + + ,       (4) 
where RMS is the negative t-statistic for the ,SKC jβ  coefficient, and SKC is deseasonalized cloud 
cover in New York City. Our measure of disclosure standards is ITEMS, the number of 
nonmissing items (in thousands) reported in the Compustat database entry related to the firm’s 
annual report from the prior fiscal year (i.e., in the fiscal year that ended in the prior calendar 
year) minus the average number of items (in thousands) for all firms with available data in the 
firm’s industry (Fama-French 48-industry classification) in the same year. The adjustment for 
industry-year means corrects for variation in reporting standards and necessary disclosures 
across industries. We focus on the number of Compustat items to be consistent with our CIFAR-
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based measure of disclosure standards at the country level, while retaining a large sample of 
firm-year observations.20  
We proxy for the breadth of ownership and unsophisticated investor participation using 
the number of shareholders (#SHAREHOLDERS) reported in the 10-K in the prior year. Grullon, 
Kanatas, and Weston (2004) use #SHAREHOLDERS as a proxy for individual investor 
ownership. In each year, we split firms into above-median and below-median groups based on 
the number of shareholders. Within each number-of-shareholders group, we split firms again in 
each year based on the institutional ownership ratio (IOR), calculated with quarterly 13-F data 
from Thomson Reuters. Institutional ownership is a common proxy for sophisticated investor 
presence. We calculate IOR as the fraction of institutional ownership in each quarter and average 
over quarters in a calendar year to form an annualized measure.  
To test the hypotheses, we regress RMS on ITEMS. We also allow the coefficient on 
ITEMS to be different across groups of firms based on #SHAREHOLDERS and IOR. We control 
for several observable features that are expected to be associated with disclosure standards and 
also may be predictive of noise in returns, including log market value, squared log market value, 
log number of shareholders, market-to-book ratio, log firm age, share price, and fixed effects for 
industry, year, and stock exchange. Market value is the average daily market value based on 
closing price and shares outstanding from CRSP. The market-to-book ratio is based on 
Compustat-reported values and is measured in the prior year. Firm age is defined as the current 
year minus the first year the firm appeared in CRSP. Share price is the price at the beginning of 
                                                     
20 Recall that the CIFAR scores, which are used extensively in research on disclosure standards, are based on counts 
of nonmissing data in annual reports. Alternative measures for disclosure quality at the firm level are either restricted 
in sample (e.g., AIMR scores), require assumptions about earnings and accruals (e.g., abnormal accruals), or would 
be based on returns (e.g., value relevance), which is problematic because RMS would mechanically affect estimates 
of returns-based disclosure quality proxies. 
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the calendar year. Industry is defined by the 48 Fama-French industries, based on Compustat-
reported SIC codes. 
Table 7 presents results from the regressions. Standard errors are clustered by firm to 
account for correlated errors within-firm. In model (1), the coefficient on ITEMS is negative but 
is not significantly different from zero, which fails to provide support for Hypothesis 1. 
However, this result could be attributable to weak effects of disclosure on RMS in firms with low 
participation, as we found in the international sample. Model (2) allows the coefficient on ITEMS 
to be different for firms with low and high participation, as captured by the within-year median 
split based on the number of shareholders. In model (2), the coefficient on ITEMS is negative and 
significantly different from zero #( 0.635,Highβ = −  p < 0.01) for firms with high participation, 
but is not significantly different from zero for firms with low participation. The coefficients on 
ITEMS for high and low #SHAREHOLDERS are also significantly different from each other at 
the 5% level. This result supports Hypothesis 2, which states that disclosure has a negative effect 
on RMS when there is broad investor participation. Model (3) allows the coefficient on ITEMS to 
vary by participation and sophisticated ownership, IOR. The coefficient on ITEMS is negative 
and significant #,( 0.752,High HighIORβ = −  p < 0.01) for the high participation, high IOR group, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 3. The coefficient on ITEMS for the high participation, low IOR group 
is negative, but not significantly different from zero. Overall, results from the within-U.S. sample 
corroborate the results from the international sample that disclosure can help reduce noise, 
particularly for firms with broad investor participation and high sophisticated ownership. 
In Table 8, we examine whether the relation between ITEMS and RMS within the U.S. 
sample is stronger for firms more susceptible to mood-based mispricing. Baker and Wurgler 
(2007) use high stock return volatility as a measure of stocks that have “strong speculative 
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appeal” and greater limits to arbitrage, both of which make the stock more susceptible to mood-
influenced mispricing. We measure stock return volatility in the prior year using both daily raw 
returns (Ret. Vol.) and daily idiosyncratic returns based on a market-model (Idio. Ret. Vol.).  
Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2007), Table 8 shows that stocks with higher return 
volatility in the prior year have significantly higher RMS in the current year. In Columns (1) and 
(3), we show that the coefficient on ITEMS remains negative and significant when controls for 
return volatility are included in the model. In Columns (2) and (4), we find that the coefficient on 
the interaction between ITEMS and return volatility is negative and significant at the 0.10 level. 
This finding is consistent with a stronger effect of disclosure quality on return-mood sensitivity 
in firms that are more susceptible to mood-based mispricing. 
As an additional robustness check, we examine the relation between DISC and RMS for 
firm-years in which we ex ante expect returns to be particularly sensitive to mood. To identify 
these firm-years, we use advertising expense, as Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find that 
advertising expense is associated with investor breadth and Lou (2014) finds that advertising 
expense is associated with retail investors’ purchasing. In Table IA.6 in the Internet Appendix, 
we present three regressions involving advertising expense. In these regressions, we find that (1)  
advertising expense is positively associated with RMS once we control for size, (2) ITEMS 
remains negatively associated with RMS (p < 0.001), and (3) the negative association between 
ITEMS and RMS is concentrated (i.e., significant) only for firm-years with high advertising 
expense (i.e., above the annual median). Since this is a setting with greater expected susceptible 
investor participation and hence a setting in which return-mood sensitivity should be high, these 
results provide further support for our conclusion that susceptible investor participation and 
disclosure quality jointly influence return-mood sensitivity. 
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4. Conclusions 
We examine how disclosure standard quality relates to return-mood sensitivity through 
the participation of susceptible investors. We develop a measure of return-mood sensitivity 
(RMS) using the previously documented relationship between urban cloudiness and market 
returns. We find that higher-quality disclosure standards are significantly negatively associated 
with RMS after controlling for various country-level factors, including investor participation and 
investor protections. We find evidence that disclosure standards have a greater effect on RMS in 
countries with a higher level of investor participation, as proxied by GDP and Internet usage. 
Additionally, using mutual fund and insider ownership data, we find evidence that disclosure 
standards have the greatest effect on RMS when there are low levels of insider ownership and a 
mix of noninsider sophisticated and susceptible investors in the market. Together, these results 
suggest that high-quality disclosure standards discourage susceptible investors’ mood-based 
trading and facilitate sophisticated investors’ noise-eliminating arbitrage.  
This study is one of the first to focus on how disclosure standards relate to stock return 
noise, particularly short-term mood-based noise in daily market-level returns. While we find 
consistent evidence of a negative effect of disclosure standard quality on mood-based noise in 
our sample, these results are limited to only one of many types of noise and cannot necessarily be 
extended to broader statements about market efficiency. Despite these limitations, the evidence 
suggests an interesting mitigating effect of disclosure standards on return noise that is relevant to 
future work on the consequences of disclosure regulation and market efficiency. 
 
34 
 
Appendix. Susceptible Investor Model 
There is a continuum of investors of two types. Susceptible investors are influenced by 
nonfundamental mood, M, while rational investors are not. A mass r is rational and a mass s is 
susceptible, so the mass of all investors is s + r. All investors are assumed to have constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility with risk-aversion parameter p. 
There is a single risky asset with random per-share fundamental value V, which is 
normally distributed with mean U and precision (inverse-variance) v. There is also a single risk-
less asset with a constant value of one. There is a fixed supply of one share of the risky asset per 
capita (i.e., a mass of r + s shares) and no restrictions on the supply of the riskless asset. The 
value of the risky asset, V, is realized at the end of the game, at which time investors consume.  
There is a public disclosure, D, that captures the fundamental value of the risky asset with 
noise. Specifically, D is defined as V + Q, with Q ∼ N(0, 1/q). Disclosure quality is captured by 
the precision of the disclosure, q. The limiting case of q→0 implies a completely uninformative 
disclosure, while q→∞ implies a perfectly informative disclosure.  
The random mood of the susceptible investors is M, which can have any well-defined 
nontrivial stochastic distribution. M is independent of V and D (i.e., they are stochastically 
orthogonal). Susceptible investors misattribute their mood as informative about firm value, 
meaning that they treat their mood as an additional signal about V.21 Susceptible investors treat 
their mood M as if it is a noisy signal about fundamental value with precision m. Strictly 
speaking, the precision m determines the susceptible investors’ decision weight on mood and 
should not be interpreted directly as the variance of the mood signal. 
                                                     
21 See Schwarz and Clore (2007, 2003) for a review of the psychological literature on individuals’ use of mood 
as an informative signal. 
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There are three periods. First, investors trade to take initial positions in the risky and risk-
free assets. All investors begin with wealth W and choose demand for shares x1,i to maximize 
expected utility  
 ( ){ }1, 1, 1exp i iE p x V W x P − − + −  , 
where Pt is the price of the risky asset in period t and W – x1,iP1 is the amount of wealth held in 
the risk-free asset in period 1. After taking initial positions, V, D, and M are realized. V is private, 
but D and M are observed by all investors prior to the second round of trading. In the second 
round of trading, each investor trades to a holding of x2,i in the risky asset and the market-
clearing price is P2. Disagreement between susceptible and rational investors driven by mood 
causes positive volume in the second round of trading. Finally, in the third period, the terminal 
value, V, is revealed. 
The model is similar in spirit to De Long et al. (1990), who feature rational traders and 
noise traders. The noise traders are characterized by having an exogenous, randomly biased 
belief about the risky asset’s expected price. In the model here, the susceptible traders have a 
biased belief about the risky asset’s fundamental value. Different from De Long et al. (1990), 
this model features an additional signal about fundamentals that provides value-relevant 
information and is used by both rational and susceptible traders. 
Let wt,i be the wealth of investor i maintained in the risk-free asset in period t. In period 1 
investors choose demand x1,i as a solution to 
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Since all investors are identical in the first round, we can drop the i subscript on x1,i and solve for 
investor demand as given by the first-order condition, which implies ( )1 1ˆ /x v U P p= − . P1 is set 
to equate supply and demand such that 1ˆ 1x = . This market-clearing condition implies 
1 /P U p v= − , which has a natural interpretation as the expected value of the asset net of the risk 
premium. We assume U > p/v so prices are positive. 
The realizations of D and M cause the investors to update their beliefs about fundamental 
value. The updated conditional distributions are 
 
1| ~ , , and
1| , ~ ,
r
s
Uv DqV D N
v q v q
Uv Dq MmV D M N
v q m v q m
 +
 + + 
 + +
 + + + + 
  
for the rational and susceptible investors, respectively. Investors choose demands x2,i again to 
maximize expected utility. Going into the second period, the budget constraint is
1, 2 1 2, 2 2i ix P w x P w+ = + . The rational investors choose demand x2,r as 
 
( ){ }
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2,
2, 2, 2, 1 2 1 2, 2 2,
2
2,
2, 2
ˆ arg max exp  s.t. 
arg max
2
r
r
r r r r rx
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rx
x E p x V w x P w x P w
pxUv Dqx P
v q v q
 = − − + + = + 
 +
= − − + + 
 , 
which, by the first-order condition, implies rational trader demand in period 2 of  
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 2, 2ˆ r
v q Uv Dqx P
p v q
 + +
= − + 
 . 
For the susceptible investors, a similar analysis implies  
2, 2ˆ s
v q m Uv Dq Mmx P
p v q m
 + + + +
= − + + 
. 
The market-clearing condition is r + s = rx2,r + sx2,s, which implies 
 2
MG Uv qD pP
G v q
+ + −
=
+ +
 , 
where ( )/G ms r s= − . The risky asset’s return from period 1 to period 2 is R = P2/P1 – 1. 
Substituting, returns can be written as 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
1
/ /
Uv qD p MGR
G q v U p v G q v U p v
+ −
= − +
+ + − + + −
 , 
which can be interpreted as returns based on fundamentals (the first two terms) plus mood-based 
noise in returns (the third term). Let β  be the sensitivity of returns to mood, that is, 
 
( )( )
2
1
1 0dPdR vG
dM P dM Uv p G q v
β = = = >
− + +
. 
Observation 1: Returns are positively associated with susceptible investors’ mood. 
Note that lim 0
v
β
→∞
= , implying no sensitivity of returns to mood for a risk-free asset. 
Similarly, as disclosure quality becomes high, mood also plays no role, since lim 0
q
β
→∞
= . 
Observation 2: For a risk-free asset, mood plays no role.  
Let γ  be the sensitivity of β  to disclosure quality, that is, 
 
( )( )2
0d vG
dq Uv p G q v
βγ = = − <
− + +
. 
38 
 
Observation 3: Higher-quality disclosures reduce the mood-return association noted in 
Observation 1. 
We have the following limits of γ  as the mass of susceptible investors goes to zero or 
becomes dominant in the market, respectively, with 
 
( )( )
0
2
lim 0, and
lim lim .
s
s G m
mv
Uv p m q v
γ
γ γ
→
→∞ →
=
= = −
− + +
  
These limits imply that the negative effect of disclosure quality on the sensitivity of returns to 
mood (i.e., γ ) is stronger with high susceptible investor participation than with low or no 
participation. An increase in the mass of susceptible investors has the following effect given by 
the derivative of γ  with respect to s: 
 ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
2 2
3 2 0.
d d dG d vG rm
ds dG ds dG Uv p G q v r s
q G v vrm
Uv p G q v r s
γ γ  
= = − 
 − + + + 
− +
= − <
− + + +
  
Negative /d dsγ  means that more susceptible investors implies a stronger impact of 
changes in disclosure standards on the sensitivity of returns to mood.  
Observation 4: The impact of higher-quality disclosures on the mood-return association 
in Observation 3 is stronger when there are more investors who are susceptible to mood. 
Additionally, we can show that / 0d drγ > , since more rational traders reduce the 
susceptibility of price to mood.  
Next, we turn to 
2d
dsdr
γ
 to examine how a change in the mass of rational investors, r, 
impacts the effects of changes in the mass of susceptible investors, s, on γ : 
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For s > r or s not too much smaller than r, we have 
2
0d
dsdr
γ
< . For s << r, the second term in 
(A.1) will be positive and can overwhelm the first. 
Observation 5: As long as there are a sufficient number of susceptible investors in the 
market, the effect described in Observation 4 is stronger when there are more nonsusceptible, 
rational investors. 
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Table 1 
Sample description 
 
Country Years N RMS DISC GDP INTERNET ICRG COMM. TROP. CH MF Foreign MF NREPR 
Argentina 1995–2008 14 0.298 -1.109 9.185 0.109 0.523 0 0 0.527 0.015 0.006 0.214 
Australia 1995–2009 15 0.176 1.135 10.302 0.475 0.869 1 0 0.249 0.109 0.071 0.933 
Austria 1995–2009 15 0.324 0.502 10.325 0.401 0.885 0 0 0.549 0.136 0.117 0.000 
Belgium 1995–2009 15 0.325 0.430 10.265 0.386 0.778 0 0 0.471 0.116 0.097 0.000 
Brazil 1995–2009 15 -0.457 -0.777 8.987 0.141 0.462 0 1 0.671 0.208 0.088 0.800 
Canada 1995–2009 15 0.142 0.938 10.326 0.509 0.914 1 0 0.488 0.050 0.015 0.000 
Chile 1995–2009 15 -0.221 0.482 9.261 0.201 0.777 0 0 0.649 0.019 0.011 0.400 
Colombia 1995–2009 15 0.517 -1.135 8.817 0.115 0.421 0 1  0.003 0.003 1.000 
Denmark 1995–2009 15 0.498 0.859 10.306 0.536 0.926 0 0 0.251 0.125 0.107 0.000 
Ecuador 1998–2009 12 -0.184 -2.282 8.714 0.070 0.464 0 1    0.000 
Egypt 1998–2001, 2003–2009 11 0.210 -0.933 8.418 0.092 0.529 0 0 0.406   0.000 
Finland 1995–2009 15 -0.547 1.289 10.179 0.529 0.958 0 0 0.235 0.209 0.193 0.000 
France 1995–2009 15 0.082 0.793 10.217 0.313 0.775 0 0 0.380 0.181 0.142 0.200 
Germany 1995–2009 15 0.258 0.527 10.236 0.431 0.851 0 0 0.447 0.198 0.116 0.000 
Greece 1995–2009 15 -0.045 -0.682 9.975 0.177 0.695 0 0 0.752 0.129 0.086 0.000 
Hong Kong 1995–2009 15 0.142 0.495 10.317 0.396 0.769 1 1 0.427 0.062 0.049 0.000 
India 1995–2009 15 0.134 -0.293 7.527 0.017 0.570 1 1 0.403 0.133 0.089 1.000 
Indonesia 1998–2009 12 -0.134 -1.791 8.004 0.035 0.422 0 1 0.690 0.095 0.095 0.000 
Ireland 1995–2009 15 0.223 0.701 10.336 0.307 0.815 1 0 0.471 0.273 0.299 0.000 
Israel 1995–2009 15 0.246 0.450 9.968 0.228 0.709 1 0 0.580 0.043 0.043 0.000 
Italy 1995–2009 15 0.460 -0.778 10.148 0.248 0.708 0 0 0.375 0.128 0.103 0.000 
Japan 1996–2009 14 0.222 -0.177 10.229 0.454 0.750 0 0 0.384 0.221 0.147 0.000 
Jordan 1998–2009 12 0.256 -0.233 8.263 0.111 0.667 0 0 0.656   0.000 
Kenya 2003–2009 7 -0.248 -0.896 7.266 0.062 0.455 1 1    0.000 
Korea 1995–2009 15 0.313 -0.559 9.832 0.480 0.670 0 0 0.392 0.153 0.153 0.200 
Malaysia 1995–2009 15 0.031 0.316 9.215 0.294 0.611 1 1 0.522 0.085 0.062 0.000 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Sample description 
 
Country Years N RMS DISC GDP INTERNET ICRG COMM. TROP. CH MF Foreign MF NREPR 
Mexico 1996–2009 14 -0.448 -0.574 9.333 0.121 0.537 0 1 0.282 0.061 0.044 0.000 
Netherlands 1995–2009 15 0.565 0.747 10.355 0.541 0.932 0 0 0.237 0.194 0.178 0.000 
New Zealand 1996–2009 14 0.111 1.104 10.007 0.520 0.913 1 0 0.775 0.084 0.084 0.000 
Nigeria 2001–2009 9 0.030 -1.420 7.440 0.069 0.322 1 1    0.000 
Norway 1995–2009 15 0.381 0.753 10.646 0.543 0.893 0 0 0.411 0.145 0.123 0.000 
Pakistan 1995–1997,  
2003–2009 
10 -0.002 -0.549 7.567 0.057 0.455 1 0 0.774 0.010 0.010 0.100 
Peru 1998–2009 12 -0.146 -0.776 8.719 0.146 0.542 0 1 0.688 0.011 0.011 0.000 
Philippines 1995–2001, 
 2004–2009 
13 -0.362 -0.676 7.864 0.035 0.539 0 1 0.511 0.067 0.066 0.462 
Portugal 1997–2009 13 0.007 -0.249 9.882 0.272 0.828 0 0 0.350 0.085 0.071 0.000 
Singapore 1995–2009 15 0.150 0.772 10.508 0.415 0.844 1 1 0.571 0.110 0.092 0.000 
South Africa 1995–2009 15 0.039 0.826 8.913 0.056 0.577 1 0 0.529 0.130 0.079 0.000 
Spain 1995–2009 15 0.716 0.021 10.080 0.284 0.786 0 0 0.421 0.151 0.125 0.000 
Sweden 1995–2009 15 0.094 1.212 10.260 0.587 0.918 0 0 0.210 0.221 0.104 0.133 
Switzerland 1995–2009 15 0.122 0.625 10.404 0.506 0.838 0 0 0.257 0.185 0.152 0.000 
Taiwan 1995–2009 15 0.372 -0.430 10.020 0.392 0.701 0 1 0.223 0.145 0.116  
Thailand 1995–2009 15 0.178 -0.650 8.709 0.099 0.537 1 1 0.578 0.136 0.125 0.000 
Turkey 1995–2009 15 0.057 -1.118 9.112 0.128 0.578 0 0 0.709 0.082 0.082 0.000 
United Kingdom 1995–2009 15 0.217 1.386 10.233 0.449 0.877 1 0 0.099 0.278 0.162 0.000 
United States 1995–2009 15 0.283 0.866 10.525 0.515 0.836 1 0 0.079 0.239 0.008 0.000 
Venezuela 1998–2009 12 0.153 -1.883 9.161 0.116 0.364 0 1 0.615 0.006 0.006 0.000 
 
Country-level mean values for the primary variables of interest. Years indicate the range of years with nonmissing values for RMS and DISC inclusive. N 
indicates the number of country-year observations with nonmissing DISC and RMS. RMS is the average country-year value for RMS, which is the negative t-
statistic on deseasonalized cloud cover (SKC) in a regression of daily index returns on the world return and SKC. DISC is the average country-year disclosure 
score based on CIFAR’s disclosure index and disclosure and accounting ratings from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. GDP is the 
average of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity, provided by Euromonitor International. INTERNET is the average 
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fraction of the population who are Internet users, as reported by Euromonitor International. ICRG is an index based on the Investment Profile, Rule of Law, and 
Corruption scores from the International Country Risk Guide. COMM. is an indicator for whether the country has a common-law legal background, as reported 
by La Porta et al. (1999). TROP. is an indicator for tropical countries, based on latitudes reported by La Porta et al. (1999). CH is the fraction of the market that is 
closely held from Dahlquist et al. (2003). (Foreign) MF is the average fraction of the market capitalization held by (foreign) mutual funds based on data from 
Thomson Financial S12, SP7, and Datastream. NREPR is an indicator for nonresident equity purchase restrictions, taken from Schindler (2009) and the 
International Monetary Fund’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable No. Obs. Mean SD Min Max Median 
RMS 644 0.132 0.993 -3.308 3.905 0.062 
DISC 644 0.007 0.993 -2.830 1.668 0.083 
GDP 644 9.578 0.924 7.048 10.884 9.965 
INTERNET 644 0.295 0.271 0.000 0.923 0.209 
ICRG 644 0.705 0.181 0.188 1.000 0.733 
COMMON 644 0.342 0.475 0.000 1.000 0.000 
TROPICAL 644 0.328 0.470 0.000 1.000 0.000 
CH 601 0.453 0.179 0.079 0.775 0.447 
MF 361 0.124 0.094 0.000 0.869 0.119 
Foreign MF 359 0.091 0.072 0.000 0.572 0.085 
NREPR 624 0.122 0.327 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 
Sample descriptive statistics for the primary variables of interest. N indicates the number of country-year 
observations with nonmissing DISC and RMS. RMS is the average country-year value for RMS, which is the 
negative t-statistic on deseasonalized cloud cover (SKC) in a regression of daily index returns on the world return 
and SKC. DISC is the average country-year disclosure score based on CIFAR’s disclosure index and disclosure and 
accounting ratings from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. GDP is the average of the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity, provided by Euromonitor International. 
INTERNET is the average fraction of the population who are Internet users, as reported by Euromonitor 
International. ICRG is an index based on the Investment Profile, Rule of Law, and Corruption scores from the 
International Country Risk Guide. COMMMON is an indicator for whether the country has a common-law legal 
background, as reported by La Porta et al. (1999). TROPICAL is an indicator for tropical countries, based on 
latitudes reported by La Porta et al. (1999). CH is the fraction of the market that is closely held from Dahlquist et al. 
(2003). (Foreign) MF is the average fraction of the market capitalization held by (foreign) mutual funds based on 
data from Thomson Financial S12, SP7, and Datastream. NREPR is an indicator for nonresident equity purchase 
restrictions, taken from Schindler (2009) and the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Reports on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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Table 3 
Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
 
Variable RMS DISC GDP INTERNET ICRG COMM. TROP. CH MF For. MF NREPR 
RMS 1.000           
DISC 0.005 1.000          
GDP 0.098 0.609 1.000         
INTERNET 0.057 0.505 0.686 1.000        
ICRG 0.068 0.782 0.789 0.633 1.000       
COMM. 0.002 0.309 -0.072 0.006 0.041 1.000      
TROP. -0.093 -0.479 -0.514 -0.324 -0.604 0.132 1.000     
CH -0.070 -0.421 -0.473 -0.374 -0.476 0.022 0.193 1.000    
MF 0.069 0.381 0.397 0.450 0.379 0.021 -0.269 -0.443 1.000   
For. MF 0.105 0.307 0.358 0.411 0.369 -0.065 -0.246 -0.277 0.835 1.000  
NREPR 0.013 -0.061 -0.249 -0.158 -0.192 0.033 0.219 -0.005 -0.133 -0.160 1.000 
 
 
Bold coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level (two-sided). RMS is the average country-year value for RMS, which is the negative t-statistic on deseasonalized 
cloud cover (SKC) in a regression of daily index returns on the world return and SKC. DISC is the average country-year disclosure score based on CIFAR’s 
disclosure index and disclosure and accounting ratings from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. GDP is the average of the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity, provided by Euromonitor International. INTERNET is the average fraction of the population 
who are Internet users, as reported by Euromonitor International. ICRG is an index based on the Investment Profile, Rule of Law, and Corruption scores from the 
International Country Risk Guide. COMM. is an indicator for whether the country has a common-law legal background, as reported by La Porta et al. (1999). 
TROP. is an indicator for tropical countries, based on latitudes reported by La Porta et al. (1999). CH is the fraction of the market that is closely held from 
Dahlquist et al. (2003). (Foreign) MF is the average fraction of the market capitalization held by (foreign) mutual funds based on data from Thomson Financial 
S12, SP7, and Datastream. NREPR is an indicator for nonresident equity purchase restrictions, taken from Schindler (2009) and the International Monetary 
Fund’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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Table 4 
Main regression results 
 
Parameter (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
DISC -0.050  -0.112 ** -0.114 *** -0.126 *** -0.185 *** -0.213 ** 
 (0.038)  (0.046)  (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.057)  (0.094)  
GDP   0.141 ***   0.100  0.142 ** 0.016  
   (0.045)    (0.061)  (0.065)  (0.739)  
INTERNET     0.541 *** 0.274      
     (0.168)  (0.236)      
ICRG         0.305  0.129  
         (0.460)  (0.755)  
COMMON         0.163 **   
         (0.078)    
TROPICAL -0.245 ** -0.163 * -0.199 ** -0.163 * -0.188 **   
 (0.091)  (0.086)  (0.087)  (0.084)  (0.086)    
             
Country FE no  no  no   no   no   yes  
Year FE yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Cluster country  country  country  country  country  country  
R-square 0.057  0.066  0.064  0.067  0.071  0.124  
No. Obs. 644   644   644   644   644   644   
 
Results of regressions of the form, * 'i i i iRMS DISC Xα β ε= + + Γ + , where RMS is a measure of return-mood 
sensitivity, DISC is a measure of disclosure standards, and X is a vector of controls. GDP is the natural logarithm of 
per capita GDP measured at purchasing power parity, and INTERNET is the fraction of the population who are 
Internet users, both provided by Euromonitor International. ICRG is a proxy for the institutional environment, based 
on the rule of law, corruption and investment profile indices compiled by the International Country Risk Guide. 
COMMON is an indicator variable for whether the country has a common-law legal background, as reported by La 
Porta et al. (1998). TROPICAL is an indicator for tropical countries, using latitudes reported by La Porta et al. 
(1999). FE is shorthand for fixed effects, meaning a vector of indicator variables being included as additional 
controls. N. Obs is the number of observations used in the regression. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors clustered at the country level are listed in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Asterisks 
denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level. 
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Table 5 
Tests of participation and sophistication hypotheses 
 
 Partition variable  Hierarchical partition 
 GDP  INTERNET  CH  MF   MF by CH   
Parameter (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)     (5) 
DISC*Low Partition Var. -0.095  -0.088  -0.345 *** -0.174     
 (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.099)  (0.172)     
DISC*High Partition Var. -0.325 *** -0.331 *** -0.077  -0.216 *    
 (0.111)  (0.108)  (0.153)  (0.117)     
DISC*Low CH*Low MF          -0.203  
          (0.153)  
DISC*Low CH*High MF          -0.531 *** 
          (0.183)  
DISC*High CH*Low MF          0.214  
          (0.216)  
DISC*High CH*High MF          -0.190  
          (0.206)  
GDP -0.069  -0.064  0.438  -0.123   -0.167  
 (0.775)  (0.781)  (0.767)  (0.825)   (0.962)  
ICRG 0.154  0.224  -0.036  -0.199   -0.822  
 (0.721)  (0.728)  (0.760)  (0.930)   (0.852)  
            
Country and year FE yes  yes  yes  yes   yes  
Cluster country  country  country  country   country  
R-square 0.127  0.127  0.123  0.140   0.142  
Number of observations 644   644   601   556     541   
 
 
Results of regressions of the form, * * 'i Split i i iRMS DISC Split Xα β ε= + + Γ +∑ , where the dependent variable, 
RMS, is a measure of return-mood sensitivity. DISC is the disclosure standards score based on the CIFAR index and 
the Global Competitiveness Report. GDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP measured at purchasing power 
parity, and Internet is the fraction of the population who are Internet users, both provided by Euromonitor 
International. Low and High GDP (INTERNET) are indicators based on a median split at the country level based on 
2002 GDP (INTERNET). High (Low) CH is an indicator for countries where the fraction of the market that is 
closely held is above (below) the median, based on closely held data from Dahlquist et al. (2003). High (low) MF is 
an indicator for countries for which the average fraction of the market capitalization held by mutual funds is above 
(below) the median, based on data from Thomson Financial S12, SP7, and Datastream. In Column (4), the median 
split on MF is taken based on the entire sample. In Column (5), the median split on MF is taken within each CH 
group. FE is shorthand for fixed effects, meaning a vector of indicator variables being included as additional 
controls. ICRG is a proxy for the institutional environment, based on the rule of law, corruption, and investment 
profile indices compiled by the International Country Risk Guide. All models include country- and year-level fixed 
effects (FE). White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the country level are listed in 
parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) 
level. 
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Table 6 
Additional international-sample regressions 
 
Panel A: Controlling for foreign participation 
Extra control NREPR  Foreign MF 
parameter (1)   (2)     (3)   (4)   
DISC -0.213 **    -0.353 *   
 (0.102)     (0.188)    
DISC*Low CH   -0.356 ***    -0.365 * 
   (0.105)     (0.187)  
DISC*High CH   -0.096     -0.341  
   (0.152)     (0.303)  
Extra Control 0.429 **    2.196    
 (0.190)     (1.457)    
Extra Control * Low CH   0.053     2.517  
   (0.271)     (1.742)  
Extra Control * High CH   0.651 ***    1.447  
   (0.225)     (2.759)  
GDP 0.337  0.377   -0.249  -0.229  
 (0.882)  (0.813)   (1.692)  (1.682)  
ICRG 0.204  0.257   1.381  1.408  
 (0.779)  (0.790)   (1.514)  (1.566)  
          
Year FE yes  yes   yes  yes  
Country FE yes  yes   yes  yes  
Country-clustered SE yes  yes   yes  yes  
R-square 0.126  0.132   0.140  0.140  
Number of observations 585   585     350   350   
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Panel B: Cross-sectional country-level regressions 
Parameter (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
Intercept -1.278 ** -1.781 *** -1.408 ** -1.226  -1.343 * 
 (0.562)  (0.629)  (0.687)  (0.777)  (0.689)  
DISC -0.123 * -0.154 ** -0.187 ** -0.173 ** -0.191 ** 
 (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.076)  
GDP 0.149 ** 0.198 *** 0.179 ** 0.158 ** 0.175 ** 
 (0.057)  (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.074)  (0.065)  
COMMON 0.130  0.181 * 0.209 ** 0.212 ** 0.226 ** 
 (0.093)  (0.094)  (0.097)  (0.098)  (0.098)  
TROPICAL -0.198 ** -0.193 * -0.220 ** -0.249 ** -0.223 ** 
 (0.097)  (0.099)  (0.101)  (0.106)  (0.101)  
CH     -0.367  -0.311  -0.442  
     (0.276)  (0.288)  (0.284)  
MF     -0.182  -0.143  -0.945  
     (0.660)  (0.668)  (0.972)  
NREPR       -0.052    
       (0.169)    
Foreign MF         1.086  
         (1.019)  
           
Adj. R-square 0.195  0.268  0.264  0.252  0.268  
N 46   40   40   39   40   
 
 
Panel A presents results of additional regressions at the country-year level. Panel B presents results of additional 
regressions at the country level based on averages of country-year values. RMS is the dependent variable and is a 
measure of return-mood sensitivity. DISC is the disclosure standards score based on the CIFAR index and the 
Global Competitiveness Report. High (Low) CH is an indicator for countries where the CH, the fraction of the 
market that is closely held is above (below) the median, based on data from Dahlquist et al. (2003). (Foreign) MF is 
the fraction of local market capitalization held by (foreign) mutual funds based on data from Thomson Financial 
S12, SP7, and Datastream. NREPR is an indicator for nonresident equity purchase restrictions, taken from Schindler 
(2009) and the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. GDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP measured at purchasing power parity. ICRG is a proxy 
for the institutional environment, based on the rule of law, corruption and investment profile indices compiled by the 
International Country Risk Guide. COMMON is an indicator variable for whether the country has a common-law 
legal background, as reported by La Porta et al. (1998). TROPICAL is an indicator for tropical countries, using 
latitudes reported by La Porta et al. (1999). FE is shorthand for fixed effects, meaning a vector of indicator variables 
being included as additional controls, and SE is shorthand for Standard Errors. Standard errors are listed in 
parentheses below each coefficient estimate. In panel A, standard errors are clustered at the country level and 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity following White (1980). Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 
1% (***) level. 
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Table 7 
Firm-level RMS regression results within the United States 
Parameter\Model (1)   (2)   (3)   
ITEMS -0.2909      
 (0.182)      
ITEMS * Low # Shareholders   0.1188    
   (0.276)    
ITEMS * Low # Shareholders * Low Inst. Ownership     0.4643  
     (0.455)  
ITEMS * Low # Shareholders * Hi Inst. Ownership     -0.0278  
     (0.344)  
ITEMS * Hi # Shareholders   -0.6346 ***   
   (0.244)    
ITEMS * Hi # Shareholders * Low Inst. Ownership     -0.5243  
     (0.514)  
ITEMS * Hi # Shareholders * Hi Inst. Ownership     -0.7519 *** 
     (0.283)  
Log(# Shareholders) -0.0010  -0.0030  -0.0033  
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
Log(MV) 0.0373 *** 0.0372 *** 0.0360 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  
Log(MV)*Log(MV) -0.0040 *** -0.0038 *** -0.0038 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Log(Firm Age) 0.0301 *** 0.0299 *** 0.0291 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Share Price 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Low # Shareholders     -0.0073       
      (0.010)       
Low # Shareholders * Low Inst. Ownership         -0.0138   
          (0.014)   
Low # Shareholders * Hi Inst. Ownership         -0.0188 * 
          (0.011)   
Hi # Shareholders     absorbed     
              
Hi # Shareholders * Low Inst. Ownership         -0.0275 ** 
          (0.013)   
Hi # Shareholders * Hi Inst. Ownership         absorbed 
       
Fama-French 48 industry FE yes  yes  yes  
Year FE yes  yes  yes  
Firm-clustered standard errors yes  yes  yes  
R-square 0.089  0.089  0.089  
N 80,823   80,823   80,823   
 
Results of regressions of the form, * 'j j j jRMS ITEMS Xα β ε= + + Γ +  and 
* * 'j Split j j jRMS ITEMS Split Xα β ε= + + Γ +∑ , where j denotes firm-year. RMS a measure of sentiment-based 
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noise in returns, ITEMS is a measure of reporting quality, and X is a vector of controls. Nonmissing Compustat 
Items (ITEMS) is the industry-year adjusted (observation minus average) number of nonmissing Compustat items 
for the firm's 10K (in thousands). All regressions include the following controls: Log(Market Value), Log(Market 
Value) squared, log(# of shareholders), Market-to-Book ratio, Log(Firm Age), Share price, Fama-French 48-
industry indicators, calendar year indicators, and indicators for split variables. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are listed in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level. 
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Table 8 
Additional U.S. firm-level RMS regression results with return volatility interactions 
 
Parameter\Model (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
ITEMS -0.318 * -0.317 * -0.315 * -0.321 * 
 (0.185)  (0.185)  (0.185)  (0.185)  
Ret. Vol. 0.014 *** 0.013 ***     
 (0.005)  (0.005)      
ITEMS * Ret. Vol.   -0.386 *     
   (0.206)      
Idio. Ret. Vol.     0.012 ** 0.012 ** 
     (0.005)  (0.005)  
ITEMS * Idio. Ret. Vol.       -0.344 * 
       (0.208)  
         
Controls included yes  yes  yes  yes  
Firm-clustered standard errors yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 79,581  79,581  79,581  79,581  
R-square 0.080   0.080   0.080   0.080   
Results of regressions of the form, , , , 1 , ,* * 'j t j t j t j t j tRMS ITEMS volatility Xα β γ ε−= + + + Γ + , where j denotes 
firm and t denotes year. RMS a measure of return-mood sensitivity, ITEMS is a measure of reporting quality, 
volatility is a measure of stock return volatility, and X is a vector of controls. ITEMS is the industry-year adjusted 
(observation minus average) number of nonmissing Compustat items for the firm's annual report (in thousands). Ret. 
Vol. is the standard deviation of daily returns, taken from the prior calendar year. Idio. Ret. Vol. is the standard 
deviation of idiosyncratic returns based on a daily market-model regression estimated for the firm in the prior 
calendar year using the value-weighted market return. Both Ret. Vol. and Idio. Ret. Vol. are standardized to be mean-
0 and unit-variance. All regressions include the following controls: Log(Market Value), Log(Market Value) squared, 
log(# of shareholders), Market-to-Book ratio, Log(Firm Age), Share price, Fama-French 48-industry indicators, 
calendar year indicators, indicators for split variables. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are listed in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Asterisks denote significance at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level. 
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Internet Appendix Tables 
Table IA.1 
Additional robustness checks 
 
Model: RMSpos  1998-2009  GDP Quintiles  Lag Returns  
Parameter\Model variant: (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
DISC -0.152 ** -0.240 ** -0.163 ** -0.147 ** 
 (0.059)  (0.116)  (0.063)  (0.059)  
GDP 0.037  0.248  0.043  0.026  
 (0.484)  (1.038)  (0.505)  (0.497)  
GDP Q1     -0.196    
     (4.706)    
GDP Q2     -0.184    
     (4.741)    
GDP Q3     -0.362    
     (4.743)    
GDP Q4     -0.283    
     (4.787)    
GDP Q5     -0.348    
     (4.807)    
ICRG -0.052  -0.019  -0.050  0.083  
 (0.472)  (0.847)  (0.491)  (0.487)  
Lag(Market Returns)       0.074  
       (0.151)  
         
Country FE Yes  Yes  Yes    
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes    
Cluster Country  Country  Country    
R-square 0.404  0.118  0.406  0.412  
N. Obs 644   535   644   592   
Results of regressions of the form, * 'i i i iRMS DISC Xα β ε= + + Γ +  where RMS is a measure of return-mood 
sensitivity, DISC is a measure of disclosure standards, and X is a vector of controls. In Model 1, the dependent 
variable is RMSpos=max(0,RMS) instead of RMS. In Model 2, the sample is restricted to 1998-2009, years for 
which the DISC proxy is based on values reported in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Reports. 
Model (3) includes GDP quintiles as additional controls. Model 4 includes an additional control for last year’s index 
returns, Lag(Market Returns). GDP is the natural logarithm of per-capita GDP measured at purchasing power parity, 
and INTERNET is the fraction of the population who are Internet users, both provided by Euromonitor International. 
ICRG is a proxy for the institutional environment, based on the rule of law, corruption and investment profile 
indices compiled by the International Country Risk Guide. COMMON is an indicator variable for whether the 
country has a common-law legal background, as reported by La Porta et al. (1998). TROPICAL  is an indicator for 
tropical countries, using latitudes reported by La Porta et al. (1999). FE is shorthand for fixed effects, meaning a 
vector of indicator variables being included as additional controls. N. Obs is the number of observations used in the 
regression. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the country level are listed in 
parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) 
levels. 
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Table IA.2 
Main regression results in changes 
Parameter (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
ΔDISC -0.292 * -0.268 ++ -0.299 * -0.278 ++ -0.257 + 
 (0.170)  (0.179)  (0.170)  (0.180)  (0.184)  
ΔGDP   -1.903    -1.598  -1.212  
   (1.758)    (1.792)  (1.830)  
ΔINTERNET     -1.616 + -1.450  -1.306  
     (1.238)  (1.264)  (1.292)  
ΔICRG         -1.446  
         (1.560)  
           
Country FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Cluster Country  Country  Country  Country  Country  
R-square 0.041  0.042  0.043  0.044  0.045  
N. Obs 595   595   595   595   595   
Results of regressions of the form, * 'i i i iRMS DISC Xα β ε∆ = + ∆ + Γ ∆ +  where ∆  indicates changes, RMS is a 
measure of return-mood sensitivity, DISC is a measure of disclosure standards, and X is a vector of controls. GDP is 
the natural logarithm of per-capita GDP measured at purchasing power parity, and INTERNET is the fraction of the 
population who are Internet users, both provided by Euromonitor International. ICRG is a proxy for the institutional 
environment, based on the rule of law, corruption and investment profile indices compiled by the International 
Country Risk Guide. FE is shorthand for fixed effects, meaning a vector of indicator variables being included as 
additional controls. N. Obs is the number of observations used in the regression. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the country level are listed in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
Asterisks and plus-signs denote significance at the 10% (*), 15% (++), and 20% (+)levels. 
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Table IA.3 
Main regression results with return volatility control 
Parameter (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
DISC -0.076 * -0.132 *** -0.143 *** -0.151 *** -0.196 *** -0.206 ** 
 (0.042)  (0.049)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.057)  (0.093)  
Ret. Vol. -14.608 ** -13.616 * -15.140 ** -14.340 ** -13.090 * -11.735  
 (7.075)  (7.086)  (7.029)  (6.972)  (7.115)  (8.785)  
GDP   0.133 ***   0.080  0.140 ** -0.204  
   (0.046)    (0.058)  (0.065)  (0.748)  
INTERNET     0.562 *** 0.348      
     (0.175)  (0.223)      
ICRG         0.219  0.168  
         (0.465)  (0.746)  
COMMON         0.155 **   
         (0.075)    
TROPICAL -0.246 *** -0.169 * -0.198 ** -0.170 ** -0.197 **   
 (0.090)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.081)  (0.085)    
             
Country FE No  No  No   No   No   Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Cluster Country  Country  Country  Country  Country  Country  
R-square 0.065  0.073  0.073  0.075  0.077  0.128  
N. Obs 644   644   644   644   644   644   
 
Results of regressions of the form, * 'i i i iRMS DISC Xα β ε= + + Γ +  where RMS is a measure of return-mood 
sensitivity, DISC is a measure of disclosure standards, and X is a vector of controls. Ret. Vol. is return volatility 
measured as the standard deviation of daily index returns, GDP is the natural logarithm of per-capita GDP measured 
at purchasing power parity, and INTERNET is the fraction of the population who are Internet users, both provided by 
Euromonitor International. ICRG is a proxy for the institutional environment, based on the rule of law, corruption 
and investment profile indices compiled by the International Country Risk Guide. COMMON is an indicator variable 
for whether the country has a common-law legal background, as reported by La Porta et al. (1998). TROPICAL  is 
an indicator for tropical countries, using latitudes reported by La Porta et al. (1999). FE is shorthand for fixed 
effects, meaning a vector of indicator variables being included as additional controls. N. Obs is the number of 
observations used in the regression. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the 
country level are listed in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 
5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
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Table IA.4 
Main regression results with Tropical interactions 
Parameter\Model (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
DISC * Not Tropical -0.084  -0.148 ** -0.149 *** -0.164 *** -0.206 *** -0.239 ** 
 (0.051)  (0.057)  (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.069)  (0.106)  
DISC * Tropical 0.007  -0.049  -0.079  -0.076  -0.152  -0.217  
 (0.047)  (0.068)  (0.074)  (0.077)  (0.094)  (0.198)  
GDP * Not Tropical   0.164 ***   0.119 * 0.132  -0.289  
   (0.046)    (0.065)  (0.082)  (0.881)  
GDP * Tropical   0.110    0.030  0.175 ** 0.105  
   (0.076)    (0.099)  (0.075)  (0.827)  
INTERNET * Not Tropical     0.510 *** 0.268      
     (0.161)  (0.235)      
INTERNET * Tropical     0.825 ** 0.645      
     (0.381)  (0.519)      
ICRG * Not Tropical         0.446  0.832  
         (0.572)  (0.930)  
ICRG * Tropical         -0.190  -0.413  
         (0.697)  (1.178)  
COMMON * Not Tropical         0.099  Absorbed  
         (0.075)    
COMMON * Tropical         0.322 ** Absorbed  
         (0.135)    
Not Tropical 0.218 ** -0.372  0.245 * -0.605  0.274  Absorbed  
 (0.085)  (0.848)  (0.146)  (1.004)  (0.820)    
             
Country FE No  No  No  No  No  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Cluster Country  Country  Country  Country  Country  Country  
N 644  644  644  644  644  644  
R-Square 0.05818   0.06738   0.0672   0.06939   0.07386   0.1264   
Results of regressions of the form, * 'i i i iRMS DISC Xα β ε∆ = + ∆ + Γ ∆ +  where ∆  indicates changes, RMS is a 
measure of return-mood sensitivity, DISC is a measure of disclosure standards, and X is a vector of controls. GDP is 
the natural logarithm of per-capita GDP measured at purchasing power parity, and INTERNET is the fraction of the 
population who are Internet users, both provided by Euromonitor International. ICRG is a proxy for the institutional 
environment, based on the rule of law, corruption and investment profile indices compiled by the International 
Country Risk Guide. COMMON is an indicator variable for whether the country has a common-law legal 
background, as reported by La Porta et al. (1998). (Not) Tropical  is an indicator for (non-)tropical countries, using 
latitudes reported by La Porta et al. (1999).  FE is shorthand for fixed effects, meaning a vector of indicator variables 
being included as additional controls. N. Obs is the number of observations used in the regression. White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the country level are listed in parentheses below each 
coefficient estimate. Asterisks and plus-signs denote significance at the 10% (*), 15% (+), and 20% (++) percent 
levels. 
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Table IA.5 
Cross-sectional country-level regressions with Tropical interactions 
Parameter (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
Intercept -1.338 * -2.095 ** -1.737  -1.612  -1.690  
 (0.784)  (0.887)  (1.058)  (0.991)  (1.086)  
DISC * Not Tropical -0.139  -0.165 * -0.183 ** -0.176 ** -0.185 ** 
 (0.085)  (0.081)  (0.088)  (0.082)  (0.090)  
DISC * Tropical -0.125  -0.231  -0.295 * -0.245  -0.253  
 (0.120)  (0.149)  (0.166)  (0.166)  (0.175)  
GDP * Not Tropical 0.158 * 0.232 ** 0.215 ** 0.211 ** 0.213 * 
 (0.080)  (0.089)  (0.104)  (0.096)  (0.106)  
GDP * Tropical 0.153 * 0.158 * 0.152  0.100  0.154  
 (0.086)  (0.091)  (0.095)  (0.123)  (0.097)  
COMMON * Not Tropical 0.055  0.106  0.118  0.124  0.129  
 (0.114)  (0.112)  (0.116)  (0.107)  (0.122)  
COMMON * Tropical 0.271  0.469 ** 0.531 ** 0.713 *** 0.447 * 
 (0.170)  (0.200)  (0.213)  (0.215)  (0.235)  
CH * Not Tropical     -0.003  -0.004  -0.004  
     (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
CH * Tropical     -0.006  0.005  -0.004  
     (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
MF * Not Tropical     -0.386  -0.641  -0.728  
     (0.866)  (0.866)  (1.303)  
MF * Tropical     -0.147  -2.433  -2.044  
     (1.271)  (1.715)  (2.416)  
NREPR * Not Tropical       -0.185    
       (0.239)    
NREPR * Tropical       0.215    
       (0.319)    
Foreign MF * Not Tropical         0.422  
         (1.184)  
Foreign MF * Tropical         3.594  
         (3.865)  
TROPICAL -0.239  0.323  0.272  0.095  0.113  
 (1.162)  (1.265)  (1.456)  (1.577)  (1.493)  
           
Adj R-Sq 0.176  0.291  0.247  0.360  0.219  
N 46   40   40   39   40   
This Table presents results of additional regressions at the country level based on averages of country-year values. 
RMS is the dependent variable and is a measure of return-mood sensitivity. DISC is the disclosure standards score 
based on the CIFAR index and the Global Competitiveness Report. High (Low) CH is an indicator for countries 
where the CH, the fraction of the market that is closely held is above (below) the median, based on data from 
Dahlquist et al. (2003). (Foreign) MF is the fraction of local market capitalization held by (foreign) mutual funds 
based on data from Thomson Financial S12, SP7 and Datastream. NREPR is an indicator for non-resident equity 
purchase restrictions, taken from Schindler (2009) and the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Reports on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  GDP is the natural logarithm of per-capita GDP measured at 
purchasing power parity. COMMON is an indicator variable for whether the country has a common-law legal 
background, as reported by La Porta et al. (1998). (Not) Tropical  is an indicator for (non-)tropical countries, using 
latitudes reported by La Porta et al. (1999). Standard errors are listed in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
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Table IA.6 
Firm-level RMS regression results within the US – including Advertising expense 
Parameter\Model (1)   (2)   (3)   
ITEMS -0.9153 *** -1.0305 ***   
 (0.342)  (0.342)    
ITEMS * Low Ad. Expense     -0.8098  
     (0.524)  
ITEMS * Hi Ad. Expense     -1.2196 *** 
     (0.448)  
Low Ad. Expense     -0.0026  
     (0.019)  
Ad. Expense 0.0095  0.0189 *** 0.0187 ** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  
Log(AT)   0.0301 * 0.0306 * 
   (0.015)  (0.016)  
Log(AT)*Log(AT)   -0.0048 *** -0.0049 *** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  
Log(MV) 0.0348 *** 0.0438 *** 0.0437 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
Log(MV)*Log(MV) -0.0060 *** -0.0026 ** -0.0025 ** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Market to Book Ratio 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Log(Firm Age) 0.0243 *** 0.0290 *** 0.0290 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
Share Price 0.0002 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
       
Fama-French 48 Industry and Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-clustered standard errors Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-Square 0.093  0.094  0.094  
N 25,483   25,483   25,483   
 
Results of regressions of the form, * 'j j j jRMS ITEMS Xα β ε= + + Γ +  and 
* * 'j Split j j jRMS ITEMS Split Xα β ε= + + Γ +∑  where j denotes firm-year. RMS a measure of sentiment-based 
noise in returns, ITEMS is a measure of reporting quality, and X is a vector of controls. Non-missing Compustat 
Items (ITEMS) is the industry-year adjusted (observation wminus average) number of non-missing Compustat items 
for the firm's 10K (in thousands). Ad. Expense is the log of 1+Advertising Expense in dollars. Hi/Low advertising 
expense are based on annual median-splits. AT is total assets in dollars. All regressions include the following 
controls: Log(Market Value), Log(Market Value) squared, log(# of shareholders), Market to Book ratio, Log(Firm 
Age), Share price, Fama-French 48-industry indicators, calendar year indicators, and indicators for split variables. 
White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are listed in parentheses below 
each coefficient estimate. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***) levels. 
 
